Four years ago, Japan turned an important page in its post-1945 remilitarization saga. As the tactics and strategies of warfare in the AI age were still unraveling in Ukraine, Tokyo stunned the world by breaking away from traditional pacifism. In December 2022, policymakers across the world took note as Japan raised its defense expenditure to 2 per cent of its GDP, for a four-year period from 2023-2026. The aim was to undertake Japan’s biggest military buildup since World War II.
Carrying even more shock value was the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), which conveyed to Japan’s friends and foes its adoption of a radical new counterstrike doctrine. This meant that the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) would acquire attack capabilities, particularly the ability to neutralize imminent threats in enemy territory.
Tokyo has since been steadily deploying its attack platforms along its southwestern Ryukyu Islands, the southernmost islet of which is located a mere 111 km from Taiwan. To say China has been rattled would be a severe understatement. Adding fuel to the fire is Japan’s increasingly assertive rhetoric. In recent times, Japan has openly termed a Taiwan contingency as an event that would warrant a military intervention, while it has also shed its historic aversion to talking about nuclear weapons.
Japan appears to be on the cusp of realizing a fundamental transformation. The country is now gearing up to usher in the next phase of its remilitarization, starting once again with a substantial hike of its defense expenditure.
The budget request submitted by Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) in July 2026 puts forth a 70-80 trillion-yen (500 billion USD) outlay for defense during FY 2027-2031. If approved, the upper estimate is nearly double the current budget, although the eventual allocation is expected to be finalized at around 70 trillion yen in December 2026.
AI, unmanned systems, stand-off capabilities, integrated air and missile defense, space and cyber are among the nine priority areas identified for defense modernization. A closer look, however, shows a more interesting trend – Japan may be completely revamping its approach to defense modernization altogether.
Traditionally, for the JSDF, modernization has centered around acquisition of hardware and platforms. This is the approach that also prevailed during 2023-2026, which was earmarked for the first phase of operationalizing counterstrike. From deploying the indigenously-developed Type 12 Surface to Air Missiles, to training with the American-made M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), this period was focused on building the foundations of its long-range strike capability.
The new budget request however states an intent to “drastically strengthen Japan’s deterrence and response capability” by adapting to “new ways of warfare”. Of particular importance in this light is to strengthen targeting capabilities by bringing about a convergence of AI, space, communications networks, unmanned systems and stand-off weapons. This strategic convergence shall work to improve the speed and accuracy of targeting.
For the JSDF, AI in particular shall serve as “an important part of the architecture that allows those capabilities to function together”. It is to realize the same that the JSDF plans to deploy an “AI Orchestrator Platform” and a cloud computing system. While the orchestrator platform shall interconnect various systems, the latter will facilitate transmission of sensitive data and ensure uninterrupted communications.
In effect, these technologies shall streamline and connect the various parts of the whole within the larger system of systems. This also points to Japan’s understanding on how an upper hand is to maintained in an anti-access/area-denial environment. Without the ability to detect, track and continuously update targeting information on mobile targets over long distances, long-range strike systems have little operational value.
The new bout of modernization hence focuses on the entire sensor-to-shooter architecture. Ensuring efficient functioning of a sensor-to-shooter architecture within an interconnected battle management system, is in turn contingent on the transmission of real-time information. The AI Orchestrator Platform and the cloud, in sync with space assets, can potentially help accelerate information processing, while connecting disparate kill chains to form a kill web. This would help reduce targeting errors and maximize efficiency.
As Japan thinks ahead about how it shall best prepare for a war, serious economic woes stand in the way. However, this has not stopped the Donald Trump administration from pressuring Tokyo to increase its defense spending to NATO standards (5% of GDP by 2035). Amid severe fiscal constraints and uncertainty over how it will finance its ambitious defense budget, Japan has been smart in how it has gone about appeasing the United States.
Japan has sought to interpret defense economy in a broad way. Japan’s 2026 White Paper stresses on how defense investments can benefit the wider economy and improve the lives of its citizens. Japan is bringing a number of expenditures under the defense ambit, including for energy, ports, railways, AI, development assistance and even some of its space missions.
In this background, a major focus of Sanae Takaichi’s government has also been to explain to the public the necessity of increasing defense spending. The government had already implemented a 4% defense surtax on corporates in April 2026. It is now actively considering options including tobacco taxes and another corporate tax hike to fund defense expenditure until 2031.
Japan may even engage in some harmless arithmetic manipulation which it has historically used to cope with US pressure. Irrespective of the scale of spending allocated, the substance of the amped up defense budget is what is bound to matter for Japan’s future in a dynamic geopolitical environment.
The credibility of Japan’s emergence as a formidable military power would also be backed by the revision of its core security documents next month. In the long run, this would also allow Japan to effectively coordinate with American forces to jointly respond to a range of contingencies.
Disclaimer: The article expresses the author’s views on the matter and do not reflect the opinions and beliefs of any institution they belong to or of Trivium Think Tank and the StraTechos website.



