# The New Cartographers of Power: Who Controls the World's Digital Chokepoints?

> The next strategic contest in the Indian Ocean may be fought far below the surface. As the importance of submarine cable networks grows steadily, India faces a tough question: who controls the undersea digital infrastructure on which its economy and security depends?

- Source: https://www.stratechos.com/articles/the-new-cartographers-of-power-who-controls-the-worlds-digital-chokepoints
- Publication: StraTechos (https://www.stratechos.com)
- Authors: Mohammad Taha Ali
- Published: 16 November 2026 (updated 16 November 2026)
- Section: Technology & Security · Topics: Critical Infrastructure
- Reading time: 4 min · 892 words
- Audio narration: https://www.stratechos.com/api/media/file/the-new-cartographers-of-power-who-controls-the-worlds-digital-chokepoints.mp3
- License: © Trivium Think Tank. Quote with attribution and a link.

**The brief (60 words):** The next strategic contest in the Indian Ocean may be fought far below the surface. As the importance of submarine cable networks grows steadily, India faces a tough question: who controls the undersea digital infrastructure on which its economy and security depends?

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The next war in the Indian Ocean might not even involve a ship. Instead, the true battle ground may lie 5,000 meters beneath the surface. That's where more than 1.5 million kilometres [of undersea cables](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/07/indias-stake-in-the-global-subsea-cable-race) carry the data that keeps financial markets moving, government communications flowing, military communications **connected** and entire economies humming.

Cables carry more than 99% of [global intercontinental data](https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics/global-connectivity-report-2025/). They also foster dependencies as much as they link: how and where they are landed, who controls them, and who bears the cost of maintaining them can determine which countries are connected to these networks and which remain dependent on others.

Block Field

Submarine cables connect**** the Indo-Pacific, East Africa, West Asia and Europe with a network of [routes](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/07/indias-stake-in-the-global-subsea-cable-race) along the Bab el-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Malacca Strait. The breaking of the [Red Sea cables](https://www.csis.org/analysis/red-sea-cable-damage-reveals-soft-underbelly-global-economy) in February 2024 exposed the vulnerabilities of these vital connectors. Multiple [cables](https://blog.cloudflare.com/q1-2024-internet-disruption-summary) were cut, putting parts of Asia and Africa off line. Many further issues with repairs revealed how [territorial](https://takshashila.org.in/content/publications/20260720-subsea-cable-governance.html) conflicts, political authorizations and access to the seas can delay the restoration of digital connections.

The episode exposed a disturbing fact: a disruption under the sea can have repercussions across whole economies. But physical damage is only one part of the problem. The more pertinent question is who gets to decide the architecture of global connectivity.

Increasingly, that role is being filled by [technology companies](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-digital-economy-and-society-outlook-2026_022ed474-en/full-report/trends-in-access-and-connectivity_bec0045e.html), who are moving beyond simply buying bandwidth to financing and shaping the networks themselves. Recent examples include [Google’s](https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/infrastructure-and-cloud/google-cloud/whats-a-subsea-cable/) investments in subsea infrastructure and [Meta’s](https://about.fb.com/news/2026/09/announcing-petal-meta-petabit-transoceanic-cable/) proposed 50,000-kilometre Project Waterworth. Companies that own, fund and manage underlying assets have the ability to influence connectivity routes, access partnerships and the geographic placement of digital capacity. This growing entanglement of commercial ownership with national security is becoming a concern for governments.

**Situating India**

India's digital connectivity presents a strategic paradox. As recent studies highlight, [Mumbai](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/07/indias-stake-in-the-global-subsea-cable-race) alone is the gateway for around 95 per cent of India’s international bandwidth. This over reliance generates a strategic weakness. India might have grand ambitions of becoming a major digital power, but much of its international connectivity still depends on a small number of concentrated landing spots.

The key issue is who owns the infrastructure, controls access points, possesses the necessary hardware and can keep the network running during a crisis. Meanwhile, the growing involvement of technology companies in submarine infrastructure creates a further, under-explored dimension to this problem: who will maintain and restore connectivity when cables are disrupted.

Submarine cables are [susceptible](https://www.itu.int/en/mediacentre/backgrounders/Pages/submarine-cable-resilience.aspx?trk=article-ssr-frontend-pulse_little-text-block) to earthquakes, fishing gear, ship anchors, and malicious activities. Their repair will depend on the availability of [specialised ships](https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-weaponization-dual-use-research-vessels-undersea-data-dominance), crew and spares, while also dealing with a hostile maritime environment.

Block Field

India's reliance on overseas repair fleets highlights an additional operational shortcoming. A [recent](https://takshashila.org.in/content/publications/20260720-subsea-cable-governance.html) study on submarine cable governance identified the lack of Indian-registered repair ships and dependence on foreign repair vessels as critical vulnerabilities.

What this means is that the ability to restore connectivity, and the ability to disrupt, may lie in the hands of different actors. Vessel availability, access to repair equipment and the ability to operate in a hostile environment could be leveraged during a geopolitical crisis. The key strategic consideration would not be, who can damage the cable, but who can maintain connection for an entire region.

**Potential Indian Responses**

India should respond to this challenge under a principle of digital maritime sovereignty, which can be defined as ‘the state's ability to defend, sustain, manage and repair the submarine infrastructure that connects its territory to the world economy’. This means designating submarine cables and landing stations as critical national infrastructure, creating a concerted response team of Navy, Coast Guard, Department of Telecommunications and private operators and building in-country repair facilities via public-private partnerships.
India can [diversify](https://blog.google/intl/en-in/company-news/announcing-america-india-connect-and-new-investments-to-advance-global-ai-access/) its landing infrastructure along the eastern coastline, including around Chennai, while developing additional connectivity centres elsewhere along the coast. 

Projects such as the Chennai–Andaman and Nicobar Islands (CANI) cable demonstrate how new subsea links can extend connectivity beyond India's traditional western concentration. The Kochi–Lakshadweep–Minicoy (KLM) cable, further expands connectivity to India's island territories. Similar projects on these lines can create additional landing points and strengthen network redundancy, which can prove invaluable if existing routes are disrupted.

India should also develop an Indian Ocean Digital Infrastructure Resilience Compact with Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Seychelles, Oman and other regional partners. The compact could go [beyond](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/security-and-resilience-submarine-cables-be-focus-maritime-security-workshop-experts-eu-india-indian_en) individual landing stations by [facilitating](https://www.trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/2024-11/ICPC_UKASEAN_CABLE_14022023.pdf) cross-border cable-route monitoring, pre-approvals for emergency repairs, regional equipment depots and joint exercises between maritime authorities and telecom operators. This would effectively make cable security a [regional security](https://maritimeindia.org/enhancing-capacity-of-and-capabilities-in-repair-of-submarine-communication-cables-through-international-cooperation/) challenge instead of a national one.

Today's cartographers are helping shape the infrastructure on which governments, businesses and entire societies depend.**** For India, the question is not only how is it going to keep the Indian Ocean secured from the outside, but also how it can make sure that the digital highways are not reliant on aid, expertise or decisions coming from outside.
In the emerging connectivity-geopolitics,**** sovereignty will not only reside solely in the ownership of the network, but also in the ability to maintain and operate that network when the world around it begins to splinter.

**Disclaimer:** The article expresses the author’s views on the matter and do not reflect the opinions and beliefs of any institution they belong to or of Trivium Think Tank and the StraTechos website.
